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ABSTRACT 
All people are exposed to risks in everyday life, but they seldom experience accidents. Therefore, people 
often believe that these accidents will never happen, and they do not see the risks. 
By increasing the ability to notice risks, to see safety barriers, and to assess the safety barriers’ performance 
parameters continuously, it is possible to create better risk awareness on the part of employers, managers and 
employees. Better risk awareness by these stakeholders will make it possible to: 
• acknowledge and continuously control risks; 
• discover and manage new risks; 
• keep safety barriers intact; 
• replace safety barriers with others, if necessary; 
• monitor and maintain the quality of safety barriers. 
This will contribute to maintain a high level of safety and prevent accidents. 
Some pro-active accident prevention can be obtained by making people aware of the risks in a given 
situation, time, or place, and by enabling them to observe and judge whether the relevant safety barriers are in 
place and in good order. This can be considered “Situational Awareness” (SA), which is an essential 
competence enabling an employee to perform his/her job safely. This SA entails a number of requirements 
for people, work conditions, management, learning, knowledge, experience, motivation etc. 
The Dutch WORM and RAM projects led to the identification of 64 types of risks and the safety barriers and 
performance factors linked to these risks. The Danish DanWORM project has transferred this knowledge into 
two sets of 17 “INFO-cards” or message maps, to be used by the employer and the employee, respectively. 
Such an INFO-card is developed for a specific group of risks and contains: 
• What needs to be observed, what safety barriers are in place; 
• What needs to be assessed, the performance parameters; 
• What requires action, depending on the deficiencies that have been found. 
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BACKGROUND 
The analysis of accidents is an analysis in hindsight, since it is made after the accident has happened. The 
accident analysis can indicate several direct and indirect causes; but to a large extent, it is the fact that the causes 
occur simultaneously that makes the accident happen, rather than the presence of one single cause (Rasmussen, 
1997, Jørgensen, 2002). Precisely due to the fact that a single cause does not necessarily lead to an accident, but 
only when other causes occur at the same time, makes it difficult to point to the actual “culprit”. This makes it 
hard to perceive causes, which in one situation mean nothing, but in another are crucial for an accident to happen. 
Perhaps this is the reason why actions and choices come under scrutiny when an accident has to be 
explained and the “cause” located. There has been much focus on human errors and mistakes, where 
differentiations are made between conscious and unconscious mistakes, as well as between errors in 
workmanship, errors in memory, wrong choice of method, misunderstandings, and lack of knowledge 
(Rasmussen, 1987; Reason, 1977). This perception of the different ways in which humans make mistakes and act 
erroneously has been seen in a framework of explanations and conditions for why people make mistakes due to 
the situation and context (Reason 1997). Organization, decisions, and working conditions contribute to affecting 
what risks are present, but also whether the necessary barriers are present to prevent risks that lead to accidents 
(Reason 1997). 
This brings us to consider risk understanding and risk perception as important elements for possibilities to 
acknowledge risks and know what dangers they hold and what consequences an accident can have. Basically, 
people are not particularly good at or capable of assessing their own risks (Lin et al., 2007). Some risks are 
assessed too high and some too low, and it seems that many other factors in our lives and surroundings affect what 
we understand and acknowledge. This occasionally has the effect that we misunderstand a situation that can have 
an accident as a consequence, or else we are simply mistaken (Lin et al., 2007). It is crucial to achieve an 
understanding and acceptance of the paradox that we do not understand an accident and its causes until after the 
accident has happened, but at the same time, an accident must be prevented before it happens. Quite often, 
accident prevention initiatives in enterprises comprise investigating the accidents that happen, and then acting in 
relation to the concrete causes evidenced by the investigation. This kind of reaction, however, has turned out to 
have a limited effect and, over time, practically no effect at all (Krause, 1995). A far better preventive effort is 
achieved when management makes the decision that it wants a higher degree of safety and a more specifically 
targeted effect of the safety efforts. It is even better, if the management is able to create a culture within the 
enterprise in which employees participate in creating continuous safety improvement (Krause, 1995; Glendon et 
al., 2007; Flin and Yule, 2004). 
The necessary knowledge about risks and causes of accidents in such a process must be gathered from 
surveys and analyses of many accidents, but in such a way that the generically fundamental causes of the 
accidents happening can be gathered, as well as generic provisions, i.e. barriers that can prevent risks from 
becoming accidents. But the use of this generic knowledge is crucial for the desired results to be achieved 
(Krause, 1995; Hollnagel, 1999; Hale & Guldenmund, 2003). 
The specific risks commonly focused on are those that can result in very serious consequences if they 
develop into an accident. Especially spectacular risks, where many people are exposed simultaneously, have been 
focused upon and of course for good reason (Lin et al., 2007). But the fact is that also the so-called banal risks 
causing more traditional types of accidents are very frequent and can have serious consequences for the individual 
(Jørgensen, 2008). Far more people die due to such banal risks than from what are often characterized as “high-
risk” areas. It presents a great challenge do something about these banal risks, without neglecting the risks focused 
on presently (Jørgensen, 2008). Situation-specific awareness can be defined as: “the perception of the elements in 
the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of 
their status in the near future” (Endsley, 2000). If we do not understand what the objective of the individual is in a 
given situation, the information in the environment will carry no meaning. In addition, presuppositions and 
expectations influence the situation-specific awareness (Endsley, 2000). Actually, people should rather act on the 
basis of the direct information in the situation. They must be able to combine information and imagine incidents 
on the basis of their experiences. They must be proactive, not merely reactive. They must act from objectives and 
be capable of doing this with a certain degree of automatic and knowledgeable behaviour (Endsley, 2000). A tool 
for creating an overview of barriers as well as risks and appropriate actions, and thus heightening the situation-
specific awareness, is the development of message maps (Flin et al., 2006). Message maps are developed to create 
an overview of the users of information and the information they need, which then enables individuals to make 
decisions by themselves and act according to their own needs. Message maps can also be used as a means of 
creating a situation-specific awareness, in a decision-making process as well as in communication and 
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cooperation, including establishing how managers can support this process (Lin & Petersen, 2007; Flin et al., 
2006). 
This tool can be used in connection with proactive accident prevention by enterprises, if it is targeted at 
accident risks that are tangibly present. Methods exist for creating greater likelihood that situation-specific 
awareness is correct, and that it will be acted upon appropriately – for example, knowing what observations to be 
aware of, what barriers need to be present for everything to progress properly, and what actions are required if the 
conditions are not as they should be. This is not meant to remove proactive prevention from managerial 
responsibility, but on the contrary to support managerial responsibility with concrete tools that are especially 
useful for small enterprises. 
METHODS 
The aim is to create material that can be used to promote appropriate risk awareness and also provide 
information about which safety barriers should be in focus and how to make sure that the same safety barriers 
function optimally. 
This material must also be an easily accessible tool that enterprises can use to create risk awareness and 
proactive prevention. 
The method applied uses the thinking behind Flin’s development of message maps (Flin et al., 2006). 
presents an example of such a message map, showing a message map for the risk of  ”being hit by a movable 
object”. 
Hazard: Being hit by a movable object. 
Barrier: Controlling movable objects in the area 
Gather information Understand the information Predict and react 
Where are the movable 
objects in the area? 
Assess whether the movements 
could possibly hit you 
Secure movable objects and their 
movement path 
How do they move? Assess whether the movements 
are varied and whether they 
should be adjusted 
Adjust, signal, flag, communicate 
with your surroundings 
Can their movement become 
uncontrollable? 
Assess what could make the 
movements uncontrollable 
Check the security devices and 
information to the surroundings 
Can I be in the object’s 
movement path? 
Assess how I should act to not be 
caught in the object’s movement 
path 
Adjust your own behaviour 
Table 1.  Example of a message map for “being hit by a movable object 
Knowledge about risks, safety barriers, and quality assessment of safety barriers come from the Dutch 
project, WORM/RAM/ORCA, which has identified 64 hazards through an analysis of 9,000 serious work 
accidents (RIVM, 2008). 
A crucial element of the analyses is which safety barriers have failed and thus caused accidents. In some 
cases, the safety barriers are easy to assess, while in other cases, more detailed information is needed. 
Furthermore, it is necessary not merely to identify the safety barriers, but also to examine what qualities they have 
and what factors affect them. The factors that affect the quality of the safety barriers and thus influence the 
likelihood of an accident occurring have been termed Probability Influencing Entities (PIEs), meaning factors that 
can influence the likelihood of failure of a safety barrier. The idea is that if PIEs are entirely in order, then the 
safety barriers will be as well, and the risk of an accident happening is therefore low: on the other hand, if the 
PIEs are lacking, not in order or present, the safety barrier will be bad and the risk of an accident happening will 
be high. For each hazardous activity, the safety barriers are identified as primary and support barriers, and the 
PIEs are identified for each barrier.  
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An example of the connection between sources of danger, safety barriers and PIEs/quality parameters is 
shown in Table 2 (RIVM, 2008).   
Activity 
hazardous 
Primary 
safety 
barriers 
Support safety 
barriers 
Evaluation criteria – PIEs 
Work at 
placement 
ladders/ Risk of 
falling 
1 Ladder 
strength 
1. Type of ladder 
and its strength 
Conditions of ladder steps 
Inspection of ladder capacity and length 
Maintenance and storage 
Cleaning 
2. Ladder 
stability 
2. Placement and 
protection of the 
ladder 
Placement on the ground 
Placement at the top, angle 
Protection against traffic 
3. User 
stability 
3. Ability of the 
user to stay on the 
ladder 
Position on the ladder 
Personal condition 
Use of both hands to hold onto the ladder 
External forces influence 
Appropriate movements 
Table 2 Example of the assessment of the criteria that affect the probability of accidents, in this case 
working/standing/climbing on a placement ladder  
Finally, it must be taken into consideration that both employers and employees need to possess risk 
awareness regarding risks that can lead to accidents. Most legislation places the obligation for safety with the 
employer, and there are also many conditions that the employer can ensure beforehand and which contribute to 
good and safe working conditions for employees. But it will never be possible to remove all risks, especially not 
the banal ones.  
It is also true that many employees are on their own during much of their working hours and must be able 
to judge their own work situation for themselves at each point in time. It is therefore necessary to make sure that 
an instrument is developed that can help create risk awareness of both the employer – with regard to what he can 
see, understand, and act on in advance – and the employees – with regard to what they must be able to see, 
understand, and act on in the situation (Jørgensen et al., 2010). 
RESULTS 
As a consequence of the theoretical work and the results mentioned above, and inspired by “message 
maps”, the idea was to develop a kind of INFO card to be used for education and training regarding the different 
risks. These cards would contain information about the safety barriers and PIEs for each hazardous activity, and 
focus on both what the employer should be aware of beforehand, and what the employee should be aware of in the 
situation. The model for the development of the INFO cards was inspired by the work of Bellamy (Bellamy et al., 
2009) about safety awareness, as illustrated in figure 1. 
 Figure 1. Model for the INFO cards and safety awareness (Bellamy 2009; Jorgensen et al., 2010). 
The background for the INFO cards is an understanding of which duties are the responsibility of the 
employer and which must necessarily be the responsibility of the employees, who have significant independence 
in their work. 
Management’s responsibility generally is to ensure that the necessary safety barriers are provided, used 
correctly, maintained and controlled. The safety barriers are fundamentally linked to equipment, procedures and 
competencies.  For example: 
• The employer shall ensure that the correct equipment is in place and in order, that employees know how to 
use it and are motivated to use it correctly, and that each employee knows what to do and when, if the 
equipment fails or does not suit the task. 
• The employer shall organize the work so that there is clarity about the behaviour expected from the employee, 
and the employer shall ensure that the employee knows what is expected and is motivated to fulfil these 
expectations. 
• The employees shall be aware of the competencies they need when organizing their work, and shall take part 
in improving these competencies with regard to the job’s performance when necessary. 
This means that the employee shall ensure: 
• That he knows which safety barriers shall be in order before he starts working. 
• That he has the correct equipment, knows how to use it, and is also motivated to use it. 
• That he knows the procedures, management’s expectations for carrying out the work, and finally, that he has 
acquired the necessary competencies.  
• That he takes part in communicating with the employer, when equipment, procedures, working conditions fail 
or are not in order, so that a solution can be found that adheres to safety requirements. 
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Both the employer and the employee shall be familiar with the concrete safety barriers linked to the 
individual types of risks and these safety barriers’ function, and the consequences it will have if they are not in 
order.  
INFO cards were made for all 64 hazards (RIVM, 2008), but in order to develop a clearer tool for the 
Danish project, the 64 hazards were grouped into INFO cards for 17 types of hazards (Jørgensen et al., 2010). 
Below is an illustration of the structure and content of an INFO card for the type of hazard called ”Falls from 
heights”. 
In the WORM project, this risk type is described by 12 different types of situations in which the risk of falls 
from heights can occur:  
 
1. moveable ladders   7. putting up/taking down scaffolding
2. fixed ladders   8. roofs
3. step ladders   9. surfaces with a difference in level 
4. rope ladders   10. fixed platform
5. mobile scaffolding   11. mobile platform   
6. fixed scaffolding   12. vehicles that are standing still 
 
These 12 different risk situations have different types of requirements and safety barriers, including 
legislation or guidelines.  In WORM analyses, these risks fundamentally contain four generic safety barriers that 
involve:   
1. The equipment’s strength  
2. Railings etc.  
3. The equipment’s placement and basis  
4. User stability  
The equipment’s strength concerns the carrying capacity in relation to the actual load, and whether it is 
maintained, cleaned, and used correctly – e.g. are the ladder’s steps in good condition and can they bear the 
weight of a person plus materials; or can the roof’s carrying capacity handle the weight of the persons who are on 
it? 
Railings and other protection against falls concern special safety equipment that shall ensure that 
employees do not fall from heights if they should misstep, stumble, or lose their balance for some other reason.   
The equipment’s placement and basis concerns choosing the correct equipment and using it properly. For 
ladders, this applies e.g. to the ladder’s slope and securing; for scaffolding, it applies to the support and securing.  
User stability concerns behaviour as well as the employee’s physical and mental condition in relation to 
what is required for working at heights.  It concerns how a person stands, walks and works at heights with or 
without tools, and how a person handles materials.  
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MANAGEMENT  
Hazard: Fall from heights 
Includes staying and working on all forms of ladders, scaffolding, platforms, differences in level, roofs etc. 
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
The 
equipment’s 
strength 
 
Observe whether 
theequipment is in order, 
cleaned and maintained. 
Investigate what equipment is 
needed for the tasks and its 
carrying capacity. 
Investigate whether  there  is a 
need  for  other  equipment  for 
the tasks. 
Observe whether employees 
give feedback when the 
equipment is not in order. 
Observe  employee  behaviour 
and use of the equipment.  
Evaluate whether the carrying 
capacity and construction are 
appropriate to the task. 
Evaluate the maintenance 
condition. 
Evaluate the need for remedial 
measures.  
Evaluate the need for information 
to employees.  
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
Ensure faults are rectified and 
remove defective equipment. 
Inform employees about which 
equipment they must use and 
which equipment is defective or 
being repaired. 
Ensure there are procedures for the 
work and for cleaning and 
maintenance. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they work at heights, 
and what feedback they must give 
when they find that things are not 
in order. 
Railings Observe the need for railings. 
Observe the railing quality.  
Observe whether railings are 
mounted correctly and in good 
maintained condition. 
Evaluate accessibility, maintenance, 
strength and set‐up of railings. 
Evaluate the motivation to ensure 
maintenance of the railing quality. 
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform employees about how they 
shall behave.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when railings are lacking or 
are not in order.  
The 
equipment’s 
placement 
and basis 
Observe the equipment’s 
placement and basis. 
Observe the possibility that 
external circumstances can 
affect the equipment. 
Observe the need for special 
measures for protection. 
Observe employees ability to 
protect the equipment.   
Check approval of the 
equipment. 
Evaluate the possibility for 
sideslipping, tipping. 
Evaluate the possibility that 
someone can bump into or affect 
the equipment’s balance.  
Evaluate employees’ ability and 
motivation to set up and use 
equipment correctly. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform employees of the correct 
method and ensure that it is used. 
Instruct on setup, securing, 
foundation, placement, etc. 
Motivate employees to comply with 
procedures.  
User stability Observe employees’ state of 
health before they are sent to 
heights. 
Observe the weather before 
the task starts. 
Observe the employees' 
behaviour towards footwear, 
free hands. 
Evaluate whether employees are 
OK. Evaluate whether employees 
can handle the task. 
Evaluate whether employees  know 
how  their  behaviour  should  be 
when working at heights. 
Evaluate  employees’  motivation  to 
exhibit safe behaviour. 
Ensure instructions/agreements are 
clear. Ensure there is a good 
division of responsibility and tasks. 
Create positive motivation for safe 
behaviour.  
Ensure there is a consequent 
attitude toward violations. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Fall from heights 
Includes staying and working on all forms of ladders, scaffolding, platforms, differences in level, roofs etc. 
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
Evaluate 
Act/perform 
The 
equipment’s 
strength 
 
Observe whether the 
equipment is in order, cleaned 
and maintained. 
Investigate what equipment is 
needed for the tasks and its 
carrying capacity. 
Investigate whether there is a 
need for other equipment for 
the tasks. 
 
Evaluate whether the carrying 
capacity and construction are 
appropriate to the task. 
Evaluate the maintenance 
condition. 
Evaluate the need for remedial 
measures.  
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that the correct equipment 
comes into use. 
Remove defective equipment. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if the conditions are not 
in order.  
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
Need for 
railings 
Observe the need for railings. 
Observe the quality and 
strength of the necessary 
railing. 
Observe whether the railing is 
mounted correctly and is in 
good maintained condition. 
Evaluate accessibility, maintenance, 
strength and set‐up of railings. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if there are deficiencies 
and what measures are necessary. 
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
The 
equipment’s 
placement 
and basis 
Observe the equipment’s 
placement and basis. 
Observe the possibility that 
external circumstances can 
affect the equipment. 
Observe the need for special 
measures for protection.  
Check approval of the 
equipment. 
Evaluate the possibility for 
sideslipping, tipping. 
Evaluate the possibility that 
someone can bump into or affect 
the equipment’s balance.  
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if there are deficiencies 
and what measures are necessary. 
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
User stability Observe your state of health 
before you work at heights. 
Observe the weather before 
the task starts. 
Observe the need for 
particular behaviour, including 
footwear and free hands to 
hold on with. 
Evaluate your own ability to work at 
heights. 
Evaluate whether you can handle 
the task. 
Evaluate which behaviour is needed 
in the task for your and your 
colleagues’ safety 
Evaluate methods of transport of 
materials and tools that shall be 
used for working at heights. 
 
Know the necessary 
instructions/agreements. 
Know who has the responsibility 
and tasks. 
Ensure there are aids to lift 
materials and equipment, so you 
have one hand free to be able to 
hold on. 
Carry out the task with safe and 
professional behaviour. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Part of the Danish project has been to develop an easy-to-use tool to help an enterprise register the 
activities that comprise the different tasks, including the risks that are innate to the tasks as well as the condition 
of the necessary barriers during the execution of the activities. The objective of the Danish project, however, is to 
make it easy for small enterprises to gain control of safety. Combining the investigation of a trade to learn how the 
tasks are being done with the Dutch data and knowledge of barriers and PIEs for concrete risks, constitute a good 
basis for creating objective-specific message maps for concrete trades. This creates the opportunity to be very 
specific about what is important for small enterprises to focus on as well as what the employees should learn and 
know, namely how to assess risks in their daily, often very diverse, work processes. 
The Danish investigation has also made it obvious that it is necessary to distinguish what is expected that 
the employer must handle; what must be taught and instructed; and finally, what the individual employee must 
take care of to achieve a higher level of safety. This is supported by several other research results, which indicate 
that it is not until safety is prioritized and created in cooperation between employer and employee that a low risk 
of accidents is continually achieved. 
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Proactive prevention can then be assisted by using such tools as message maps or INFO cards. These can 
be part of the empirical data that must form at the core of proactive prevention. 
How these results are to be transferred afterwards to both small and large enterprises is still not determined. 
This leaves a key question not answered by this project. Especially small enterprises do not have much awareness 
or interest in the safety problem. They themselves declare that they are doing fine and do not really have time for 
other tasks than those demanded of them by their clients. Implementation therefore relies on communication. 
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